A number of economic policies are believed X=LW+Yn to influence an individual's decision of how many (1) hours or weeks to work. Among these policies are L = T-Z welfare programs, income maintenance plans, and unemployment insurance. To date, questions of income, L is working time, and T is total time agricultural labor response to economic incentives a . M o t a have been analyzed by resorting to aggregate data rangian, and models, typically utilizing state or U.S. time series data.' While this does provide needed in-(2) G = U(X, Z)-X X-(T-Z)W--Yn ' formation for analysis of some policies, aggregate yields the first order conditions: data and models are deficient in isolating substir u= tution and income effects. These are necessary for (3) UZ = xw analysis of particular programs affecting only in-
come or affecting the individual's budget constraint in a discontinuous way. In particular, agSolution of equations (3) for L yields the labor gregate models cannot approach the question of supply function a backward bending supply curve, since aggregate (4) L = L(W, Yn). data include not only variations in duration of employment but also variations in labor force
The familiar Slutskyequation is obtained by participation.
differentiating the first order conditions (3) with respect to W and Yn and solving for OL/OW and The paper focuses on labor supply at the OL/0Y: micro level, presenting estimates of labor supply parameters for use in analyzing alternative eco-OL LLs nomic policies directed toward agricultural labor (5) yL
where OL/OW is the total effect of a change in the wage rate. The total effect is decomposed into THE ECONOMIC MODEL an income effect, (OL/0Yn)L, where L is the equilibrium labor supply, and a substitution efThe standard income-leisure analytical framefect, 0LS/OW. The latter term is. unambiguously work is assumed with a twice differentiable conpositive, given that the utility function is concave cave utility function in goods (X) and leisure (Z), whereas the sign of the income effect is ambiguous U(X, Z).
2 The individual is assumed to maximize and requires empirical evidence. Although the U(X, Z) subject to budget and time constraints, income effect is typically assumed to be negative respectively:
(assuming leisure is a normal good), only its ob- This variable is somewhat troublesome, even with reporting bias, poor memory and the implicit complete information, since many sources of such imputation of weekly wages as the product of an income are in some way tied to labor supply.
hourly wage and hours worked (or analogously Examples are unemployment insurance, welfare the piece rate by the number of pieces completed)., payments, and food stamps. Individuals who reUnobserved true wages are assumed to be a logported the receipt of any such items or payments linear function of socio-economic variables as must be a priori excluded from the analysis. The well as the location of the individual in the state typical difficulty is that this type of income is the [equation (6)].
major source of non-employment income among Since there are essentially no non-employment low-income persons. The major remaining source income data in the date file, Y2* is also a nonof non-employment income is assets and debts, but observed variable in equation (10) . As noted this information was not collected in the survey above, ownership of housing is observable. This under consideration. The only piece of information is included as a polytomous variable with Y2 1 available is whether the family owned a house, for no housing, 2 for ownership of a trailer, 3 for trailer, both, or neither. Although this is not deownership of a house, and 4 for ownership of tailed information of the type we would like to both. Equations (8-9) represent the assumed rehave, it does permit us to draw limited inferences lationship of Y 2 to Y2*. This specification assumes on income effects and is so utilized, that the magnitude of non-employment income Y 2 * is a constant multiple of our polytomous variable Yz, ignoring the stochastic term £ 2 for The Stochastic Specification the moment. Unobserved non-employment income is asThe equations of direct interest in the model sumed to be a log-linear function of weekly wages, are (6-10) in Table 1 The sample has been restricted to married in the range in which the estimator is unstable male family heads for the results presented in this 4 Inclusion of a supply equation for weeks in the model is being undertaken in further research, but its treatment is beyond the scope of the present paper. 5 The usual procedure for continuous variables would not include Y, as an instrument. However, exclusion of Y 2 as an instrument gave results which were rather suspicious, particularly for the coefficient of lnY 2 . The estimated '2 was -1.2398 which differs substantially from the reported estimate, and as will be pointed out below, differs even more from reported estimates based on other data sets where superior information is available for this variable. Although it is recognized we are committing an error in either case, inclusion of Y 2 as its own instrument appears to be preferable.
paper. 6 The estimated supply equation for hours is indicated with a standard error less than one during the week prior to interview is as follows: Inferences on the substitution effect must be Thus the gross response of hours of work to a made with reference to the observed wage rechange in the hourly wage rate is /31/1-/3S. Simisponse and income effect. The observed income larly, all other coefficients are divided by (1-/,i) coefficient in equation (16) 
Cov (P/3. 3k).
;/ik ip/ wage elasticity, and the final term is total income form used by most earlier studies. Third, a decielasticity. Estimates of £ and "Yn with their sion time unit of a week is used rather than a standard errors from equation (16) data, a proxy is used to measure non-employment The missing piece of information is the ratio income. Finally, there is more detail available on of WL to Yn. Although WL is observable, the wages and hours than in other data sources. In latter term is not. One way of approaching this particular, these variables are reported as conproblem is to select alternative values for the tinuous variables rather than interval values as ratio and evaluate CS for each of them. As will in other data sources. be shown, this does not drastically reduce the information content of our results. A reasonable lower bound for the ratio is five, assuming that CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS labor earnings are at least five times non-employment income. Estimates of Is are presented in Although emphasis has been placed on ob- Table 2 for selected values of the ratio, WL/Yn. taiing estimates of the substitution and income These show that for reasonable values of the ratio effects of wage rate changes, not to be overlooked WL/Yn, the income-compensated wage effects are are the gross labor supply estimates of response moderately elastic. 9 to wage changes. The estimated labor supply function has a positive slope with a coefficient more A not infrequent conjecture with respect to .
farm workers is that they have an income target 00 -co o for which they strive. Assuming that they have met this under the prevailing wage, the implication of the income target hypothesis is that inThe above results are somewhat different than creases in wage rate will lead to a reduction in those reported by other researchers [2, pp. 332-number of hours worked: the worker has met his 333]. Total income elasticities correspond closest target and at a higher wage he can meet it sooner. with other studies, while substitution effects are
The above results do not support this conjecture, somewhat stronger than those of other studies, alternatively labeled as a backward bending labor typically based on the SEO data file. Of all studies supply curve. Rather, estimates imply than an reported in Cain and Watts [2, pp. 332-333], increase in wage rate would be accompanied by none were greater than unity and most were in a nearly equally proportionate increase in labor the neighborhood of zero.
supply since the elasticity is .87. Some of the major differences between this Information on income and substitution efstudy and earlier studies follow. Most previous fects provides a starting point for more detailed work has been based on the SEO data file, alanalyses of public policy programs such as inthough the CPS data, the National Longitudinal come maintenance plans and unemployment inSurvey data, and Census Public Use files have surance protection which directly alter the indialso been used. All these are household surveys vidual's market trade-off between goods and rather than employer-based surveys. Secondly, a leisure. The simplest type of income maintenance logarithmic form is used rather than the additive program would involve an income transfer to those individuals who, for one reason or another, the wage rate of working poor people by subdo not have the income earning potential to obsidizing it. Although both the income and substitutain a "minimal" income level. In this case, only tion effects would be operating, their effects the income effect would be operative. Estiwould be in opposing directions. Estimates premates of the income effect imply a moderate desented in this paper indicate that the substitution dine in labor supply by participants in this type effect would dominate. Thus, to the extent that of program. The more common proposal, for no adjustment in the wage rate is paid by an emexample H.R.1 (June 1971), is typically much ployer, such a policy would lead to an increase more involved, imposing a negative tax on earnin hours worked. ings of participants. For the purposes of analysis, Detailed analyses of such programs typically these programs can alternatively be characterized require extensive simulation efforts. Policy varias involving a lump sum transfer with earnings ables of interest which can be estimated by such taxed away at a positive rate until the initial transanalyses would be the aggregate magnitude of fer is depleted. This adjustment involves both an labor supply change, participation level in the income effect and a substitution effect. The overprogram, distribution of benefits in the program all adjustment would be to reduce the labor supand cost of the program. Research is currently ply of participants, since the income and subunderway applying some results to the impact of stitution effects would both imply a reduction extending unemployment insurance protection to in the number of hours worked.
agricultural workers. This involves not only a An alternative public policy which has resimulation of the program but also additional ceived some consideration is a wage subsidy proestimation of labor supply functions for alternagram. The government would effectively increase tive time periods.
